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Abstract
The Psychological Ethics and National Security (PENS) task force was assembled by the American
Psychological Association (APA) to guide policy on the role of psychologists in interrogations at
foreign detention centers for the purpose of U.S. national security. The task force met briefly in
2005, and its report was quickly accepted by the APA Board of Directors and deemed consistent
with the APA Ethics Code by the APA Ethics Committee. This rapid acceptance was unusual for a
number of reasons but primarily because of the APA's long-standing tradition of taking great care
in developing ethical policies that protected anyone who might be impacted by the work of
psychologists. Many psychological and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as
reputable journalists, believed the risk of harm associated with psychologist participation in
interrogations at these detention centers was not adequately addressed by the report. The present
critique analyzes the assumptions of the PENS report and its interpretations of the APA Ethics
Code. We demonstrate that it presents only one (and not particularly representative) side of a
complex set of ethical issues. We conclude with a discussion of more appropriate psychological
contributions to national security and world peace that better respect and preserve human rights.
Introduction
The American Psychological Association (APA) has a long
history of opposing the misuse of psychological knowl-
edge in practice, assessment, research and any other activ-
ity utilizing the tools of the field [1,2]. The APA Ethical
Principles of Psychologists – Code of Conduct has long been
the guide to both acceptable and prohibited behavior
[3,4], and has long ensured the proper and safe use of psy-
chological methods. It protects U.S. psychologists, but
most important of all, those who are most exposed and
most vulnerable to the misuse of psychology and its tools
[5].
In the wake of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent
"war-on-terror", the APA decided to address the ethical
implications of psychologist "contributions" to U.S.
national security. Calling the situation an "emergency",
APA President Ronald Levant authorized the APA Presi-
dential Task Force on Psychological Ethics and National
Security (PENS) [6]. The task force report and process gen-
erated a number of controversies. One set revolved
around the appointment of task force members who were
primarily psychologists serving active military or working
in some then current capacity with the U.S. Department of
Defense (DoD) [7]. Criticism of the task force composi-
tion grew when the identification of members revealed
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deep connections with intelligence gathering, detainee
interrogations, and related operations within the DoD [8].
The report, hereafter referred to as the PENS Report, was
completed in 2005 [6]. Shortly thereafter, the APA Board
of Directors and the APA Ethics Committee accepted the
report as policy. The APA leaders had not only underlined
the importance of psychologists contributing to "national
security", but that the profession had a responsibility to
serve U.S. society [9]. APA rules and regulations on such
task forces require "emergency" reports to be ratified by
the Council of Representatives at the next Council meet-
ing. This vote did not then occur and has never occurred.
However, APA leadership have on several occasions
claimed that Council approved the report, and on almost
as many occasions, publicly retracted the statements. Most
consequential, though, is that the APA Ethics Committee
did officially approve the report, calling it, without a sin-
gle alteration, consistent with the APA Code of Ethics. Yet
it was the content of the report, and its seeming inconsist-
ency with psychological ethics, that provoked the strong-
est feelings throughout the APA membership, and less
than favorable reactions from the media, among them The
New York Times [10].
Upon adoption, the PENS report became policy binding
upon members of the APA involved in detainee interroga-
tions and other U.S. national security activities. As psy-
chologists and members of the APA, the authors will
elucidate a number of controversial issues regarding the
PENS process and weaknesses in the reasoning of the
PENS report.
The incompatible nature of the PENS report and 
the ethics code
It would be inaccurate to say there was nothing positive in
the PENS report. It had, after all, reaffirmed the 1982 APA
Resolution against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment. Also, in 2006 and again in 2007, the
Council of Representatives supported further resolutions
against torture with ever tighter and more explicit prohi-
bitions [11,12]. However, each resolution had its own
problems and serious omissions and each resolution has
preserved the direct role of psychologists in military and
intelligence interrogations. Each resolution had also
stopped far short of a "bright-line" position that, like the
American Psychiatric Association and American Medical
Association, would prohibit the direct involvement of
members in these interrogations [13].
Further supporting PENS reasoning, the APA Council of
Representatives in August of 2007 soundly defeated an
amendment attempting to restrict psychologists to health-
related services in settings that deprived persons of basic
human rights. In essence, the APA never swayed from
PENS Report Statement #7, concluding that "psycholo-
gists may serve in various national security-related roles,
such as a consultant to an interrogation..." [[6], p. 6]. It is
true the Council of Representatives never voted to
approve the PENS report in its entirety, yet while Council
has expressed reservations and at one point demanded a
certain set of actions, they have never fully opposed the
policy. Controversies regarding the PENS Report and
interrogation policy among Council members and the
APA membership have nevertheless continued unabated.
The recommendations of the PENS Report, its basic
premises, operational definitions, and reinterpretations of
the ethics code have long warranted a detailed evaluation.
This is the goal of our critique. We hope to develop ethical
considerations regarding psychologists and detainee
interrogations, and to help work toward improved poli-
cies on the role of psychologists within these settings. We
believe that this critique supports an absolute prohibition
of psychologists' direct involvement in these interroga-
tions, and that this is the safest, wisest and most ethical
course of action for the American Psychological Associa-
tion and its members. Such a ban, we believe, may also be
the safest and surest course for national security [13].
All U.S. psychologists accountable to all sections 
of the code
The PENS Report, in one of its stronger statements, explic-
itly affirmed that all U.S. psychologists, regardless of their
different applied, research-based, or practitioner roles,
were to be held fully accountable to all sections of the APA
ethics code [[6], p. 1]. This is a key conclusion, insisting,
for instance, that a "clinically-trained" psychologists act-
ing in a "consultant role" is responsible to both clinical
and consulting sections of the code, and even those sec-
tions applying to assessment and research. It equally reaf-
firms the task force's commitment to existing ethical
principles and standards within the code, supported also,
of course, by the approval of the APA Ethics Committeea.
To a large extent, we also feel comfortable with the current
Ethics Code (with the important exception of new 2002
clauses, such as 1.02, that allow compliance with local
law, regulations, or governing authorities when institu-
tional demands conflict with the psychologist's ethical
responsibilities). However, our interpretations of the Eth-
ics Code and its relationship to PENS differ fundamen-
tally from the Ethics Committee's position. In fact, we
reach the opposite conclusion, namely that the ethics
code demonstrates, in our interpretation, that it is funda-
mentally unethical for psychologists to directly participate
in military and intelligence interrogations.
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A "New" ethical dilemma and the national 
security frame
The PENS Report stated that war-on-terror interrogations
involving psychologists produced a completely new ethi-
cal dilemma, never before encountered by the APA [10].
Given psychologists' long-established place in military
and CIA intelligence gathering, and given the vast precau-
tions suggested by the literature on social influence (see
discussion of Milgram below), there was little that should
have been considered new. What was a first was the APA's
vigorous and official endorsement of psychologist
involvement under the banner of "national security"
interests. The power of this banner – whether it was cre-
ated unconsciously and took on a life of its own or
whether it was purposefully designed to influence others
– should not be underestimated.
Unresolved conflicts within the task force
Many of the problems with the task force report can be
understood through the biased majority influence that led
to several rather questionable (and objectively ambigu-
ous) conclusions. Its contradictions were at least partially
a product of several core issues that arose either from
majority or minority members of the task force. In the
report, several areas of disagreement between task force
members were documented.
One primary conflict concerned whether the content of
the task force proceedings would be open and public or
whether they would remain confidential. The majority,
the seven of nine voting task force members, insisted that
the entire discussion and decision-making process remain
secret. This decision continues to reverberate, casting the
deliberations in a negative light.
Another conflict among the task force concerned whether
the standards and definitions of torture would be based
solely on current U.S. administration standards or on
international guidelines, best represented by the Geneva
Conventions, the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, and
the Convention against Torture. The majority members of
the task force once again, with the help of the APA leader-
ship present, favored using exclusively U.S. over interna-
tional definitions, and this standard is evident throughout
the report's final conclusions.
Theoretical abstractions
The PENS report also suffers from contradictions and
ambiguities that may be largely attributable to its remain-
ing on a plane of theoretical abstraction. Evident through-
out is a complete absence of concrete examples that might
have brought further light for the task force on the ethical
challenges that psychologist-guided interrogations really
entail. We know now that these excessive abstractions are
partially due to restrictions imposed by the APA leader-
ship and enforced at the meeting [14]. The leadership per-
sistently refused task force members any latitude to
consider reports on unethical and unlawful interrogations
that had been widely reported by human rights groups
and the media throughout the first half of 2005.
The PENS Report, for instance, never mentions the well-
substantiated reports of detainee abuse. It never cites the
numerous reports of psychologist involvement in these
abuses, or even hypothetical dilemmas that psychologists
might encounter. In fact, throughout the PENS Report, no
US detention center – Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, nor the
CIA's black sites – is ever mentioned. This denial of infor-
mation is consistent with APA leadership communica-
tions well beyond PENS. Up through August of 2007, the
APA has never officially acknowledged any wrongdoing
by any psychologist, even though the evidence has been
indisputable, some of which will be described here. Seri-
ous debate requires that the participants have the auton-
omy to ponder real-world examples, as well as best and
worst case scenarios. When documented events are inten-
tionally ignored, group process is inevitably challenged in
reaching ethical and reality-based conclusions.
Despite the directives of the APA leadership to avoid con-
sideration of well-documented abuses, sections of the
PENS Report acknowledged that "...because of a setting's
unique characteristics, an individual [i.e., the detainee]
may not be fully able to assert relevant rights and inter-
ests" [[6], p. 7]. However glancing and understated this
statement seems, such references to the blatant violations
of detainee rights are in stark contrast to all other sections
of the document that dwell on the patriotic abstractions of
"national security."
While much was known about psychologist involvement
in detainee abuse prior to the PENS report, what has
become progressively clearer is that the methods used by
interrogators, guided by Behavioral Science Consultant
Teams (BSCTs) [15-17], have been intentionally shaped
by psychologists [18-20]. Many of the most objectionable
interrogation strategies had been re-designed by psychol-
ogists from U.S. military programs, primarily the Survival,
Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE) program, originally
intended to protect U.S. soldiers from undesirable
thought reform [21,22,17,23].
According to international definitions, and the under-
standing of the SERE program itself, SERE-based interro-
gation procedures constitute torture [22,23]. Official
reports and numerous journalists over the last several
years have provided extensive documentation depicting
how these SERE techniques were used in U.S. interroga-
tion practices by SERE-trained psychologists, both in
DOD and CIA detention facilities [24,25,21,22]. Yet,
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however despicable, psychology should never let these
"enhanced techniques" cause us to ignore the only some-
what more subtle techniques prescribed in the Army Field
Manual [26], the common guide for all U.S. military inter-
rogations. In the Army Field Manual, allowable interroga-
tion tactics include deception, fear escalation, ego harm,
isolation, and psychological disorientation. Regardless of
whether these techniques are ethical for professional
interrogators, they are morally problematic for psycholo-
gists, given the clearly circumscribed ethical underpin-
nings of the profession.
The proposed casebook
To a degree, the PENS Task Force recognized the report's
abstract nature. It was proposed that the task force would
continue working after the publication of the report on a
casebook that would provide specific examples of ethical
dilemmas and concrete instances of appropriate psychol-
ogist behaviors [27]. Despite this written commitment,
and a call in 2004 by the APA Council of Representatives
for the casebook's completion [28], work on it only com-
menced after the 2007 Convention. The 2007 APA resolu-
tion [12] reaffirmed the APA's commitment to a casebook
and commentary, this time in the hands of the Ethics
Committee. A call has been published requesting member
recommendations for the casebook, but those recommen-
dations are not due until March of 2008 [27]. While little
relief is in sight for detainees brought to Guantanamo in
2002, or those disappeared into the CIA's secret detention
facilities, the rate of progress to date suggests the casebook
will not be developed and made policy until the next U.S.
presidential election is upon us, or possibly even the next
administration. This speed and style is in dire contrast to
the initial "emergency" call for the PENS Task Force, and
the quick execution of the original report.
Operational definitions of interrogation and 
torture
It is worth examining other sources of ambiguity in the
PENS Report. This includes an absence of operational def-
initions presented for the most critical interrogation/tor-
ture-related terms. The PENS Report was said to be a
reaffirmation of the APA's earlier Resolution Against Tor-
ture, yet the report never defined when interrogation
becomes torture. The 2006 APA Resolution against Tor-
ture [11] cites broader human rights definitions, yet what
the APA actually considers an "ethical" interrogation and
what it constitutes as torture was never spelled out with
any precision in the PENS report. Sound, ethical decisions
require sound reasoning and a consistently agreed upon
language.
Some values of the psychological profession were never
addressed in the PENS report, such as the ethics code's
prohibition on coercing participants into research. What is
coercion in research or even in Guantanamo interroga-
tions? Detainees are incarcerated indefinitely without ade-
quate legal representation. If they provide interrogators
with useful information, they are rewarded with less iso-
lation and other amenities. If they do not cooperate, or
have no useful intelligence, they are well aware they will
be punished further. Quite apart from allegations of out-
right torture and abuse, these conditions make the inter-
rogations by definition coerced.
One PENS term most in need of an effective definition is
"degradation." Holding off on "cruel" and "inhuman" for
the moment, the report prohibits psychologists from
engaging in "degrading" behaviors (p. 1). Even if psychol-
ogists were experts in human rights law, they are left with
little APA guidance on the term's meaning in practice.
Strict psychological criteria are needed to accompany such
APA statements. The definitions provided by the Ameri-
can Heritage Dictionary are a start. The verb "to degrade"
is in part:
"1. To reduce in grade, rank, or status; demote. 2. To lower
in dignity; dishonor or disgrace. 3. To lower in moral or
intellectual character; debase. 4. To reduce in worth or
value. 5. To impair in physical structure of function."
As argued by Mayer [16], "only in an Orwellian world
could the actions of behavioral scientists in these settings
be termed anything but a process of 'degradation'." Deg-
radation is an ongoing, psychologist-designed experience
for detainees. As stated, even outside the "cruel" and
"inhuman" enhanced techniques characteristic of CIA inter-
rogations, the basic Army Field Manual [26], again the
guidebook for interrogations, proffers strategies of fear up
harsh and ego down. Such techniques are indisputably
degrading, and antithetical to the tenets of any mental
health profession.
A real case study
To push through the abstractions and concretize our
understandings of degrading practice, there is fortunately
one explicit record on a BSCT psychologist and his direc-
torial function in the interrogation process. This leaked
interrogation log [29] included a Major L., whose identity
was publicly revealed to be Dr. John Leso, a counseling
psychologist and APA member [19]. As a BSCT psycholo-
gist, Dr. Leso consulted on the interrogation of Moham-
med al-Qahtani. By any reasonable definition, the
interrogation was extreme torture [30-33]. It was not clear
from the interrogation log that Dr. Leso was present at
each and every stage of the interrogation process, and his
name tends not to appear in sections documenting the
most extreme tactics. Nevertheless, the log documents
Leso's presence during an ongoing interrogation, often
crossing the border into torture.
3405,1,"467&8-40/17&#'9&:()#'0-0%1&0'&;%90/0'%%*++,-%!./ 0112.3344452$067$859'739':1$:13/3&3/
!"#$%)%'(%&)
!"#$%&'()*%+&',-&.,+&/0-#-0,'&"(+",1%12
Those clearly documented behaviors of Dr. Leso might be
considered comparatively mild; although, they are reveal-
ing in the light of the ethics code and what is known about
BSCT practice. Dr. Leso, for instance, asked the interroga-
tors to play cards in front of Mr. al-Qahtani to determine
whether Mr. al-Qahtani was moving toward a psycholog-
ical identification (i.e., dependence) on the interrogators.
If Mr. al-Qahtani was seeking the interrogators' attention,
according to Dr. Leso's sophomoric psychological reason-
ing, this would confirm the interrogation was progressing
as planned. Dr. Leso called for the detainee to be kept
awake, and to be placed in a swivel chair, moving him in
any direction according to the will of the interrogator(s).
This rolling and swiveling mechanism was based upon
Dr. Leso's belief that Mr. al-Qahtani was relying on a cop-
ing technique consisting of the detainee focusing his
attention on a single point on the wall. Dr. Leso therefore
directed the interrogators to disrupt the detainee's ability
to hold his attention. The swivel chair served this purpose.
This combination of dependence and disorientation is
indeed degradingb.
We wish there was more known about Dr. Leso's involve-
ment. We wish we knew what part, if any, Dr. Leso played
in the more extreme forms of torture to which Mr. al-
Qahtani was subjected. We know that Dr. Leso was poten-
tially involved in abusive techniques that likely contrib-
uted to harm. Regardless of what else Leso did, we have
trouble imagining – as a professional psychologist and as
an observant human being – that he didn't notice signs of
psychological and physical deterioration evident in Mr. al-
Qahtani expression and in his physical behaviorc [32].
What was Dr. Leso's responsibility to protect Mr. al-
Qahtani's mental health? Whatever it was, Dr. Leso's coor-
dination of the interrogation only exacerbated harm.
The case of Dr. Leso and Mr. al-Qahtani speaks to the real-
ity of psychologist involvement in interrogations. It is our
belief that complex ethical considerations are involved in
any instance where psychologists participate in the over-
riding of the wishes of human beings. These ethical calcu-
lations become even more complex in situations where
psychologists are dealing with humans refusing to utter a
single word, under conditions lacking virtually all legal
protections and without an attorney or advocate present.
There is no evidence that the PENS task force or the ethics
committee considered these complex moral issues.
We must also protect ourselves from falling into the pseu-
doscience trappings recurrent throughout our discipline's
history [34], regardless of ego-based and careerist tempta-
tions. Psychologists, like others, often cannot tell when a
detainee is reluctant to provide information or when they
simply have no information to give [35]. Subtle tech-
niques of verbal pressure, it must be reiterated, are as eth-
ically problematic for psychologists as water-boarding,
the administration of drugs, or the sexual or religious tor-
ments practiced in these war-on-terror detention centers
[36-39]. Because the risk of coercion and torture is inher-
ent in these settings, the bright-line position of no psy-
chologist participation in the interrogation process, at
least for the time being, takes precedence over our best but
highly unrealistic wishes that psychologists are there to
minimize harm [13,40].
The utilitarian fallacy of national security
The principles and standards of the APA Ethics Code
apply first and foremost to the protection of those individ-
uals or groups most directly impacted by the psycholo-
gist's professionally-related engagement in the world. The
ethics code does, in at least one instance, emphasize larger
societal goals that can take many forms. For the PENS
tasks force, the national security goal, a largely societal
emphasis, is the cornerstone of its recommendations (p.
2) see also [41] for a good discussion on the excessive
attention in psychological ethics on the distal, societal
benefits to the neglect of proximal, individual benefits).
The societal "national security argument" in the PENS
report is that the potential distal protection of Americans
supersedes the psychologist's responsibility to the most
immediately vulnerable individual (i.e., the detainee) (p.
2). This is in every sense a utilitarian argument, suggesting
that risking a certain degree of harm, whether mental or
physical, to an individual (really many individuals over
an extended period) is acceptable to reduce the possibility
that many others will be harmed at a future date (see also
[9] for a further explication of this argument).
We are skeptical of this particular assessment, assuming
even that its basic foundations are reasonable. What is
more, these utilitarian arguments rarely incorporate "all
societies" within the formula; instead, the judgments his-
torically tend to be biased to protect the proponent's own
in-group, most often to the detriment of all others, i.e., the
out-group [42].
In the PENS Report, the in-group utilitarian argument is
defended through appeals to the ethics code. In particular,
Principle B: Fidelity and Responsibility is used and its tenet
that psychologists should be "aware of their professional
and scientific responsibilities to society" [[4], p. 3]. Fidel-
ity and Responsibility here is extrapolated by the PENS
Report to "gathering information that can be used in our
nation's and other nation's defense." (p. 2). We believe
this application of Principle B is particularly idiosyncratic
and over-reaching. There are other psychologist "respon-
sibilities to society" in this context that tend to be more
compelling, such as the responsibility to avoid participa-
tion in activities that could harm society's trust in the dis-
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cipline. This explicitly utilitarian phrase, moreover, is only
a small portion of Principle B, which more thoroughly
asserts that psychologists should, "...seek to manage con-
flicts of interest that could lead to exploitation or harm"
(p. 3). This clause, we believe, is far more apt to the
present situation, characterizing the ethical dangers of
psychologist-involvement in "war-on-terror" interroga-
tions.
In general, any ranking of potential contributions to
national security above protections of the most vulnerable
human clients (and trust in psychologists as caregivers) is
a high risk proposition for psychology as a profession
[43]. This is not only an unacceptable ranking of priori-
ties; it is putting highly speculative claims that can never
be substantiated above the reality of abuses that have
indisputably been witnessed across settings and over mul-
tiple occasions, spanning at this point over half a decade.
There is no real way to confirm or disconfirm the utilitar-
ian assessment. The very nature of these interrogations
and the conditions of detention have, however, been
widely and repeatedly denounced across much of the
world [44,45]. And many expert political analysts have
made sound arguments that they have placed everyone at
higher risk for acts of terrorism. At a minimum, utilitarian
arguments, to be valid, would need to encompass these
unintended side effects of the government activities being
aided by psychologists.
The truth is that APA interrogation policy has never ade-
quately weighed the radiating international effects of
detainee abuse, and their devastating impact on trust.
With psychologists actively involved in detainee interro-
gations, reports of abuse are a threat to the whole profes-
sion. The damage to public trust may also be difficult to
measure, but it is likely to be considerably more serious
than any benefits believed to accrue from this policy. The
utilitarian position is better framed as: what is best for the
most people is what protects the dignity of the single indi-
vidual, because the effects of endangering the single indi-
vidual, to any degree, are far-reaching indeed [46].
Domestic forensic psychology vs. foreign 
intelligence work: A false comparison
The battle over the APA endorsement of "psychologist-
involved interrogations" continues a long, historical bat-
tle within psychology to preserve its reputation against the
fear that members may attempt to psychologically control
or obtain information from people against their will and
outside their awareness [47]. Whether psychologists could
ever successfully accomplish such feats remains an open
question. Historically the profession has treated any effort
by psychologists to control or extract information against
a person's will, and in ways detrimental to their mental
health, as problematic, if not definitively unethical.
In this regard, one phrase in the PENS Report – critical to
its argument yet unsupported with documentation – is of
particular concern. The report argues that "it is consistent
with the APA Ethics Code for psychologists to serve in
consultative roles to interrogation...as psychologists have a
long-standing tradition of doing in other law enforcement con-
texts" (p. 1, italics added). This parallel between psychol-
ogists involved in foreign intelligence gathering
operations and forensic psychologists working with
domestic law enforcement is fundamental to the APA
position supporting psychologist participation. There is a
long history of U.S. forensic psychologists interviewing
criminal suspects for dangerousness, fitness to stand trial,
assessment of mental status and malingering, not to men-
tion treatment of those who are incarcerated. U.S. psy-
chologists conduct research on detecting deception,
linguistic evidence of coercion in interrogations, and
many other social psychological aspects of criminal inves-
tigations.
In its brief, precedent-implying phrase, the task force
obscures three profound differences between the "long-
standing traditions" of forensic psychology in U.S. "law
enforcement contexts" and the context of psychologists in
"war-on-terror" detainee interrogations. First, psycholo-
gists do not conduct interrogations in the U.S. and do not
have authority over the law enforcement officers involved
in them, as BSCTs have over the military interrogators
they train and advise during interrogations [33] (see also
log on Dr. Leso [29]). In the domestic criminal justice sys-
tem, psychologists either offer training workshops on spe-
cific topics of value to investigators, or they present the
results of linguistic or behavioral analyses of prior inter-
views, using methods developed that are too labor inten-
sive for the investigators to master. They do not sit in on
interrogations and help shape those events as members of
the interrogation team. Any who do this in the U.S. are
considered former psychologists, and now considered law
enforcement officers, answerable to the chain of command
of the police force or agency.
Second, and most important, research and consulting
forensic psychologists work in settings where prisoners
are afforded basic protections, including the right to an
attorney, habeas corpus, and the right against self-incrim-
ination. In contrast, psychologists aiding detainee interro-
gations are operating in systems in which violations of the
rule of law are systemic and legal representation and other
protections are denied. Such extreme violations of liberty
are inevitably, in and of themselves, psychologically
harmful and demeaning to the profession of psychology
[48,49]. Despite the claim of precedent, information
about domestic enforcement contexts bears little on
whether psychologist involvement in detainee interroga-
tions is adequately covered by the ethics code.
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Third, military and CIA psychologists have far fewer inde-
pendent outlets for advice and external support than
mainland forensic psychologists. PENS Statement #12
asserts that "psychologists consult [with other psycholo-
gists] when they are facing difficult ethical dilemmas,"
and cites Ethical Standard 4.06 on Consultations (p. 8).
Unfortunately, legally-binding secrecy, the chain of com-
mand, geographical separation, and other elements
within the social climate of national security work can
hamper the psychologist's ability to confer with objective,
fellow psychologists outside, for instance, Guantanamo, a
CIA black site, or a U.S. Navy Brig.
The mixed-roles rule
A mainstay argument for prohibition against psychologist
involvement is that the role inherently forces ethical com-
promises, and these constitute too great a risk for psychol-
ogists and detainees, not to mention the discipline of
psychology and national security itself [13,40]. These
compromises are evident in the PENS Report's "no mixed-
roles" rule as anywhere. The no mixed roles rule is against
"...mixing potentially inconsistent roles such as health
care provider and consultant to an interrogation..." (p. 6).
The intention is to make it more difficult for mental
health information (e.g., on specific phobias, as in the
classic novel 1984) to so easily transfer from medical
office to interrogation booth. The transfer is most easy
when it is within one and the same person, although the
practice of passing this information on through other
modalities was common practice in Guantanamo [50,51].
Regardless of this PENS rule, national security interroga-
tions take place in closed settings where the superordinate
goal is to gather information. If it serves this goal, infor-
mation can get passed from one professional to another
[40,52,53].
The no mixed-roles rule also fails to recognize that
licensed counseling and clinical psychologists are fre-
quently used in these interrogation roles (as in the case of
Dr. Leso). Such psychologists are very possibly used with
the assumption that they can derive information about
weaknesses or psychopathology from the statements,
mannerisms, and other behaviors of the detainee. The no
mixed-roles rule therefore seems to be little more than an
inadequate, quick fix, which is simply an attempt to main-
tain psychologist involvement. The overlap of responsi-
bilities within the same person is not the only source of
role conflict detrimental to the detainee. The coexistence
of psychologists as providers and interrogators, whether
or not they are within the same person, produces ethical
dilemmas in the form of multiple relationships, dual-roles,
dual loyalties, and conflicts of interest. Despite any role
demarcation, interrogated detainees are not likely to trust
any professed distinction between care-giving and interro-
gating psychologists. Any semblance of trust a detainee
might have had in a provider would inevitably erode with
the practice of psychologists as interrogators (see also on
dual relationship risks [54,48,55]. A report from the U.S.
Army Surgeon General hints at the danger, stating that
detainees have requested healthcare from BSCTs [56].
News travels, and that impacts the perception of psychol-
ogy within detention centers and well outside the bounds
of detention centers. Illusory firewalls will do little to pro-
tect vulnerable human beings from the misuse of psychol-
ogy and the radiating effects of that mistreatment.
The safety officer and behavioral drift
In order to clarify further the issue of multiple relation-
ships, it is necessary to examine the "safety officer" and
"behavioral drift" claims found in the PENS Report and
other APA sources, all suggesting that psychologists make
interrogations safe and legal [6,57-59]. One APA Monitor
article implied that psychologists' involvement in interro-
gations had less to do with making interrogations "effec-
tive" and focused instead on maintaining the mental
health of the interrogator, preventing what was called
"behavioral drift". In other words, the psychologist's pri-
mary role is to prevent an interrogator's actions from esca-
lating into torture [60]. It should not surprise anyone that
interrogators or other professionals can lose their temper,
experience moral lapses, or generally succumb to sadistic
impulses [61].
Yet if preventing "behavioral drift" involves a psychologist
providing mental health care to another interrogator,
where is the separation of roles? How is conflict of interest
avoided when a psychologist contributes to the gathering
of intelligence from detainees while clinically monitoring
the interrogator's behavioral drift? The psychologist can-
not play the protector of a detainee while concurrently
coaxing information from that same detainee. The psy-
chologist cannot guide an interrogator on manipulation
while working to monitor and restrain that same interro-
gator. What about potential conflicts of interest between
interrogators, BSCT psychologists, and the chain of com-
mand? Any interrogation psychologist role in preventing
"behavioral drift" involves, by definition, multiple and
conflicting relationships. Meanwhile, who is monitoring
the behavioral drift of the psychologist?
The APA argues that psychologists are uniquely qualified
for the role of "safety officer." Why they, better than oth-
ers, should be able to detect an interrogator's mounting
frustration and progression to abuse compared to an army
officer who was trained as a lawyer, linguist, anthropolo-
gist or school teacher is not explained. The term "behavio-
ral drift" is used as if it were a subtle process that
psychologists, with their clinical acumen, would be
uniquely able to monitor. Behavioral drift is simply a
euphemistic expression that obscures reality. It gives a
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pseudo-professional frame to what anyone could observe:
the interrogator, through frustration, anger, and subse-
quent aggression, is beginning to abuse the detainee.
If psychologists are to prevent behavioral drift, ethical
practice would require their total removal from the infor-
mation-gathering context (see [61] for more on ethical
drift interventions). Such psychologists could just as easily
be independent from the chain of command, and have no
role in monitoring or providing services to detainees. Psy-
chologists could also train anyone who enters the interro-
gation booth against behavioral drift, and perform that
training from a comfortable geographical distance.d
A more fruitful way to protect detainees lies in studying
how to facilitate whistle-blowing – a concept in need of a
less stigmatizing label. The term refers to raising concerns
outside the chain of command, and, if needed, through-
out the public sphere [62]. In these detention centers,
there are interpreters, NGO observers independent of the
chain of command, and military psychologists, all privy
to acts of abuse. There is no evidence that practicing psy-
chologists have any special qualifications for whistle-
blowing, or are any more likely to do so than others. The
empirical record produces only one potential case, that of
Michael Gelles in Guantanamo. Unlike most potential
whistle-blowers, Gelles was reporting abuse occurring in a
chain of command other than his own. Perhaps more
importantly, he was supported by his own command
[63,64,40]. It was nevertheless a brave act, and one that
needs to be more frequently emulated.
Beneficence and non-maleficence
As pointed out above, the PENS Report is skewed in the
direction of supporting psychologist involvement. It
presents one side of an argument where clear pros and
cons exist. The report selectively chooses sections of the
ethics code supporting its recommendations and omits
more salient standards that would oppose the task force's
majority position. A number of APA documents assert
that the PENS Report and the APA position on interroga-
tion are based on Principle A of the Ethics Code [6,65].
While "do no harm" tends to be the half promoted by the
APA, there are actually two sides to Principal A: Benefi-
cence, or essentially "do good," which is a world of differ-
ence from the other side, non-maleficence, or "do no
harm" [41]. Wisely, the creators of the APA Ethics Code
made beneficence the first part of its first principle, sym-
bolically preceding non-maleficence. According to the
principle of beneficence, "Psychologists strive to benefit
those with whom they work..." [[4], p. 3]. In various con-
versations with psychologists, there has been a tendency
to regard the principle of beneficence as somehow quaint;
too ideal for actual practice. Others have described Princi-
ple A as "a high level of abstraction, up with the moon and
stars" and "lofty" [66]. Others have rejected any taking of
the principle seriously, pointing to silly counterexamples;
stating that punishing a child or giving a student a bad
grade or producing therapeutic transference in a client
could all be considered acceptable examples of "doing
harm", and contrary to naïve notions of "beneficence."
Such straw person arguments ignore that each of these
examples possess the ultimate goal of bringing about ben-
efits to the individual targeted by the intervention, an aim
which is wholly absent in interrogation work on a
detainee.
The PENS Report attributes beneficence to war-on-terror
interrogations in two highly suspect ways. First, psycholo-
gist involvement in intelligence gathering and detainee
interrogations is a positive good, the report claims,
because it contributes to national security. In this frame-
work the psychologist conceptualizes the "client" as the
military, or U.S. society as a whole (p. 2)(see also [9]). The
APA Ethics Code is based, in contrast, primarily on the
individual or group receiving the psychological service,
research attention, or consultation [4]. To make the "cli-
ent" the U.S. military, intelligence, or U.S. society, is to
make a radical shift in the focus of the ethics code, too rad-
ical to be considered a traditional or widely accepted
interpretation. If every time "client" was mentioned in the
code, it could be replaced by "the military", beneficence
would be, "strive to benefit the military." As one moves
through the ethics codes, the examples only become more
absurd all the way into "Psychologists do not have sexual
intimacies with clients". There are many cases where
industrial/organizational psychologists are serving corpo-
ration interests and not the consumer per se. But these
relationships are rarely as direct and potentially harmful
as psychologists attempting to get information from
unwilling detainees.
Another distortion of "beneficence" is the misconception
that it primarily refers to psychologists in the "helping
professions," and not to "applied/consulting psycholo-
gists" whose clients are institutions. Again, the PENS
Report correctly asserts that all sections of the ethics code
holds for all U.S. psychologists, whether providers,
applied consultants, or researchers. Until beneficence is
removed from the APA ethics code – which would be a
mournful day for the profession – both halves of Principle
A should be taken seriously and applied comprehensively.
Other principles as commentary on beneficence
The APA Ethics Code in general is replete with fundamen-
tal principles, as shown here, that are avoided in the PENS
Report, and that the APA leadership fails to discuss in its
defense of its interrogation policy. Chapters could be writ-
ten about each of a dozen principles and standards in the
code and their incongruence with psychologist involve-
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ment. For example, Principle C: Integrity, Honesty and
Truthfulness (p. 3) is relevant to the extensive deception
that often takes place in war-on-terror interrogations. The
majority of the original PENS task force, in opposition to
integrity, honesty, and truthfulness, took a stand against
the imperative psychological principles of informed con-
sent and debriefing (p. 9).
Principle D: Justice (p. 3) must also be addressed. Some
ethicists argue that a special relationship exists between
the ethical principles of justice and beneficence (i.e., the
wellness-justice nexus) [67]. In fact, reports from the
American Bar Association and numerous human rights
organizations about detainee treatment at Guantanamo
Bay give more than adequate cause for a moratorium
based on Principle D alone. The same can be said for Prin-
ciple E: Respect for People's Rights and Dignity (p. 4) that
emphasizes confidentiality, self-determination, and
respect for culture and national origin [68]. Abusive reli-
gious and cultural techniques were once the bread and
butter of war-on-terror interrogations.
Do no harm: Principle and standard
"Do no harm" is one of the few aspirational principles in
the code that is also an enforceable standard. Do no harm
is the other side of the coin from beneficence; it has a pro-
tection function on the future actions of the psychologist
or the psychologist's team; it is ostensibly the "safe" in the
APA catch phrase, "safe, legal, and effective." It would also
be akin to the "safety officer" role or in the prevention of
"behavioral drift" except that the phrase do no harm is an
absolute for psychologists' participation. In contrast to
some other "ethicists", we do not believe the standard
should be weakened with qualifications or continuums of
harm [9]. When harm is treated as a legal set point, as in
the interrogation safety officer role – when it is a degree of
mental anguish that the psychologist decides should not
go further – it places the psychologist in the insidious role
of determining variations in the degree of harm. When
harm is treated as a gradation to be gauged, when the psy-
chologist is charged to judge how much harm, mental or
physical – whether the harm is likely to be temporary, per-
manent, prolonged, substantial, or significant [12,69] – a
dangerous door is opened up for the profession. A psy-
chologist safety officer role is better off as part of the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross that would strictly
enforce among interrogators a "no harm" ethic. To the
extent that the military desires a figure to judge gradations
of harm, they are better off finding legal experts, who can
better evaluate the procedures in the face of international
law, without the illusion of a health professional's stamp
of approval. Many critics have argued these decisions are
outside the competence of psychologists. We agree. Com-
petence is not a feasible goal when so many factors,
including the protracted periods of detention, make pre-
dictions of future harm impossible. What is more impor-
tant in our opinion, is that such competence is outside the
psychologist's ethical domain, because it assails the abso-
lute character of "do no harm."
Standard 1.02
The most consequential and controversial flaw in the cur-
rent ethics code is Standard 1.02 as it is written in the lat-
est, 2002 version of the code [4]. In the Introduction and
Applicability of the code, it is stated that should any con-
flict arise between a law and the ethics code, psychologists
should take whatever steps they can to resolve the
dilemma. If that fails, the code permits psychologists to
follow the law, but, and this is critical, within the bounds
of "human rights." Unfortunately, the mention of
"human rights" is only in the Introduction and Applicability
section. It is merely aspirational, not enforceable. The
enforceable section, standard 1.02, on precisely the same
topic, does not include language on human rights. Nor
does it simply say that psychologists may follow the law
over the ethics code. In addition to law, standard 1.02
includes the somewhat militaristic sounding "regula-
tions" and "governing authority" as additional forces that
permit a psychologist to abandon the ethics code. Moreo-
ver, unlike the Canadian ethics code for psychologists,
1.02 makes no mention of civil disobedience, nor does
1.02 provide guidance from the APA in resolving disputes
based on moral conscience. Therefore, in rather plain lan-
guage, the 2002 Code's enforceable 1.02 condones plac-
ing military commands and priorities over the ethical
responsibilities of the psychologist.
The practical implications of 1.02 are evident in the case
of Dr. Leso. Despite the objectionable nature of Dr. Leso's
behaviors, he had been following the standard operating
procedures (sop) of Guantanamo and of the Army Field
Manual. "Regulations", the "governing authority", and
U.S. administration interpretations of "law" all supported
his actions, even if he violated enforceable standards such
as do not harass, do not harm, and do not exploit [70]. We are
aware of at least four ethics complaints against Dr. Leso
filed with the APA Ethics office, dating back to at least
August 2006e. Because standard 1.02 allows psychologists
to treat these as superordinate to the code, it will be inter-
esting to see what actions the APA ethics committee will
take, if any, to hold Dr. Leso accountable.
In August of 2005, the Council of Representatives
requested that the ethics committee address the loophole
of 1.02. No changes in the ethics code have been made.
The 2007 APA resolution against torture, to its credit, did
include language that stated orders could not excuse tor-
ture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment;
although, whether this resolution truly supersedes Ethics
Code provision 1.02 and whether actions like Dr. Leso's
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fall under the APA's definition of "degrading" treatment,
remains unclearf. Further, the 2007 APA Resolution only
addresses conflicts between laws/regulations and the
injunction against participating in torture or cruel, inhu-
man, or degrading treatment or punishment. Laws or orders
violating other established human rights are not
addressed.
Competence and conscience
The APA ethics code warns psychologists to "...take pre-
cautions to ensure that their potential biases, [and] the
boundaries of their competence...do not condone unjust
practices" (p. 3). In an overly optimistic stance on compe-
tence, the PENS Report states, "...special safeguards may
be necessary to protect the rights and welfare of persons or
communities whose vulnerabilities impair autonomous
decision-making" [[6], p. 8]. Boundaries of competence
are perhaps most severely tested in issues of religion and
culture where, as the PENS Report mentions, "knowledge
of race, ethnicity, culture, and national origin" is involved
(p. 6). While there are no doubt efforts on the part of
some U.S. military figures to become more culturally sen-
sitive [71], there is overwhelming evidence that knowl-
edge of culture has been abused to coerce information
from detainees [16]. In settings where cultural knowledge
has been abused, particularly capitalizing on sexual and
religious taboos, even a mental health provider knowl-
edgeable about cultural issues would find it difficult to
utilize diversity education in a positive sense [68]. Fur-
thermore, psychologists rarely possess sufficient knowl-
edge about how other collaborators will use information
that a psychologist identifies and shares. Even more chal-
lenging is the fact that the ethics code permits psycholo-
gists to work outside their areas of competence in
emergencies. Unfortunately for the detainees, the military
defines the "war-on-terror" – much as the PENS task force
itself – as a perpetual emergency.
The paucity of research and the high risk of error
Professional competency demands a research base, espe-
cially when work in such high stakes contexts is involved,
and the lack of a good research base is a major reason to
prohibit psychologist involvement in detainee interroga-
tions. There is no established evidence that psychologists
are the least bit helpful in ensuring ethical ways of elicit-
ing information. There is no scientific literature that
would lead us to conclude that psychologists in these
interrogation settings provide unique competencies. We
question the statement in the PENS report that U.S.
national security interrogations have been "significantly
developed and refined" [[6], p. 5]. We do not doubt that
this work has expanded into more worldwide use, but dis-
semination itself does not portend positive growth.
Without empirical evidence that psychologists positively
contribute to these interrogations – that their presence
improves the veracity of the information obtained – then
there is little reason to assume unique competencies.
Meanwhile, social psychological research indicates that if
anything, estimates of one's own competency can be seri-
ously overestimated. No expert of any kind possesses error
free methods of determining who is or who is not telling
the truth in an interrogation, or who is and who is not a
"terrorist." In fact forty years of research on the detection
of deception shows there is a very high risk of error even
among trained interviewers, and that deception detection
accuracy is little better than chance [35]. The conse-
quences of psychologist error in military detention sites
could be severe, and perhaps most important, lead to
punitive actions toward a detainee that is beyond the psy-
chologist's control.
Research ethics and detention center practice
It is a bitter irony that war-on-terror interrogations are so
perilous for the research participant that no study resem-
bling their conditions could be devised following the APA
Ethics Code on Research. Internal Review Boards (IRBs) in
the U.S., overseeing the protection of human participants,
would never allow experiments in public or private uni-
versities that would approach the conditions in Guantan-
amo. IRBs and university researchers are sensitive to
potential research abuse and afford research participants
extensive protections [41,72]. Furthermore, without sim-
ulating high-risk degradation, no US study could provide
the ecological validity to approach the conditions of "war-
on-terror" interrogations. We have no doubt that to coun-
ter criticisms about generalizability, psychologists have
considered secret research conducted within military or
intelligence settings on detainees as research participants.
We strongly object to such non-transparent research on
the most vulnerable of populations [73]. However, since
the APA has tied its interrogation policy to its ethics code,
we hope that the APA would also find such research unac-
ceptable.
Our optimism is tempered by awareness that, parallel to
the changes to standard 1.02, clauses governing research
were also weakened, providing greater leeway to dispense
with informed consent, and permit the increased use of
deception. Thus, standard 8.05 now allows informed con-
sent to be disregarded "where otherwise permitted by law
or federal or institutional regulations" [4]. Similarly, in a
statement resembling the very definition of torture and
the qualifying limits of "severe", clause 8.07 allows decep-
tion, except "Psychologists do not deceive prospective par-
ticipants about research that is reasonably expected to
cause physical pain or severe emotional distress" [4].
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As all U.S. psychologists are accountable to all sections of
the APA ethics code, it is worth noting that a psychologist
consulting on interrogations is conducting an experiment
of sorts. The justifiably strict codes for ethical research are
therefore pertinent to these experiments. It is ironic in the
sense that the PENS report is essentially encouraging very
real-world interrogation practices that are substantially
higher risk than research in university settings. In university
settings, informed consent is required, deception carefully
monitored, withdrawal from a study permitted without
penalty, and debriefing essential [74,75].
Perhaps most ironic is the revolution that developed in
social scientific ethics surrounding a series of studies on
obedience conducted by Stanley Milgram [76]. This
research examined the willingness of naive participants to
inflict increasing levels of shock (to the point of implied
death) on an ostensibly naïve participant (who was actu-
ally a planted, experimental confederate, and never
harmed in the study).
Milgram's findings are relevant to the interrogation debate
because they speak to psychologist-involvement in dis-
tant, secret special-operations detention centers under
military command or at CIA black sites. The experiments
depict the psychological pressures for obedience to
authority active on human beings. These experiments
additionally speak to the moral climate that once existed
in the APA and the world of psychologists [47]. Those rig-
orous standards were designed to protect research partici-
pants (and researchers alike) from engaging, even
inadvertently, in harmful research protocols; and produc-
ing even the temporary illusion in research participants
that they were harming another human being.
It is obvious that the activities within Abu Ghraib, Guan-
tanamo, CIA black sites, and U.S. Navy Brigs far exceed in
intensity and duration the psychological harm to partici-
pants in the Milgram studies. After Milgram, the American
Psychological Association worked to radically alter psy-
chological research ethics. For this reason, Milgram's
experiments were banned despite the hope that, with
research knowledge and education, people could be inoc-
ulated against blind obedience [76]. It is worth noting
that strong actions by the APA and ethics committee to
address these concerns, at that time, increased public
respect for and confidence in the profession.
Knowledge derived from obedience studies
Meanwhile, we can hear the message of the Milgram and
Zimbardo [77] experiments, that no single individual,
regardless of education – whether a psychologist or non
psychologist – is ever fully inoculated from the tendency
to obey authority, especially within closed contexts. Work
pressures in the detainee detention sites greatly amplify
the dangerous situational factors. Interrogation psycholo-
gists are answerable to their commanding officer who has
complete say in these special-ops. In these sequestered,
deindividuating, government settings, authority figures
are proximate and their needs and goals immediate, criti-
cal factors shown by Milgram to increase obedience [76].
Given the substantial physical and psychological distance
of detention sites from the outside world (and the psycho-
logical distance of the interrogation team from the
detainee), the CIA or U.S. military psychologist is in a
position far more intense than any faced by Milgram's
naïve participants [76]. Interrogators in these war-on-ter-
ror settings, pressed from above to get information, una-
ble to differentiate between detainees who are lying and
those who are telling the truth, are likely to become frus-
trated when faced with resistance [78].
Psychologists themselves are not inoculated from these
vulnerabilities. Many are likely to invest more emotion-
ally in the interrogation's success than did Milgram's par-
ticipants. The Milgram experiments suggest that
competence involves the ability to question and assess
authority, to hold to one's perceptions and act accord-
ingly. The authority of the Milgram experimenter pales in
comparison to the authority of the commanding officer of
a military operation. The authority is total and cannot be
disobeyed without opening oneself to potentially severe
consequences. Any psychologist at Guantanamo or the
black sites who questions the orders of the commanding
officer to get more intelligence with methods that offend
the psychologist but not the commanding officer, could
be severely disciplined.
Conclusion and future directions
The stated aim of the PENS Report was to meet the "high-
est ideals" of the discipline. Indeed, the world's largest
mental health organization should strive for nothing less.
We have critiqued an array of flaws within the PENS
Report, and yet we are optimistic that positive restorative
steps will be taken. For instance, there is an opportunity
now for the APA to provide U.S. psychologists, overseas
and sequestered, with clear, firm, and unequivocal ethical
guidelines. The APA can reaffirm its responsibility to pro-
tect its members, the field, and those impacted by its tools
[1]. The APA can share in the responsibility for adverse
actions caused by psychologists in foreign detention
camps and CIA black sites. The APA can recognize that the
legality of a setting is a necessary precondition of ethical
practice. It can join the American Bar Association in recog-
nizing the illegalities of these detention systems, confirm-
ing that national security concerns may be best met by
embracing international law and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.
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The APA can also reframe its appropriation requests to the
U.S. Congress. Rather than requesting additional money
to study "effective" interrogation methods [79], the APA
could attempt to bring increased attention and funding to
their own largely ignored PENS statement that "...certain
settings may instill in individuals a profound sense of
powerlessness." (p. 6). The APA's lack of response to this
understated truth reflects as much as anything the mis-
shapen priorities of the whole PENS initiative. Whenever
such profound "powerlessness" arises in any area of psy-
chological practice, it should be responded to with a
resounding call to reduce the sense of helplessness and
resulting trauma. Psychologists should concentrate their
efforts into healing and empowering individuals, not in
exploiting a sense of powerlessness in the service of intel-
ligence gathering. Fighting powerlessness and trauma
should be a highest priority and should be addressed
directly; it should never be mentioned, as in the PENS
Report, as a mere afterthought.
The APA can ensure that its ethical standards hold as rig-
orously for illegally detained citizens of foreign nations as
it does for U.S. clients in psychotherapy (and U.S. partici-
pants in research). We wish of course that the APA could
have taken a more collaborative and humanitarian
approach from the beginning, and that PENS had never
come into existence. It is, however, never too late to direct
resources toward a greater psychological understanding of
other cultures, expanding communicative exchanges
across all nations and religions [68,80]. Such a commu-
nity-based psychological effort would have been an ideal
substitute to a procrustean 'ethics of interrogation'. Yet
there is little reason to wish for a better past with the
opportunities offered by the present.
From the events of the PENS process, the APA can encour-
age research investigations into majority influence; invest
in its own program evaluations to understand and prevent
such group-think-based errors in the future. They can
encourage the study of minority influence, whistle blow-
ing, civil disobedience, and nonviolence when moral
necessity calls.
Aggressive monitoring of psychologists in detention
camps is another promising route for the APA, with a
determined emphasize on accountability. The APA can
publicly affirm that psychologist involvement violates
APA ethics; demand an independent investigation of prac-
tices in detention sites to discover the truth about reports
of abuse by psychologists; engage in restorative discipli-
nary action against psychologists who have already vio-
lated ethical standards; press the U.S. government to work
collaboratively on stringent safeguards; and present itself
as a protective authority for psychologists to turn to in
morally complicated situations. If the APA believes itself
ineffectual or unwilling to take on such tasks, an interna-
tional group of psychologists (e.g. the psychological
equivalent of the U.N.) should be developed that can seri-
ously take on such organizational oversight.
The American Psychological Association has a long his-
tory of humanistic ideals, human rights, and the striving
for a greater peace. During WWII, eminent psychologists
from Gordon Allport to Edward Chase Tolman signed the
Psychologist's Manifesto [81], calling on the utilization of
psychological knowledge in the service of peace, opposing
the abuse of power through psychological means. Psy-
chologists have much to contribute to national security,
world security, and world peace through nonviolence. The
field possesses a rich potential to discover the negative
consequences of verbal abuse, deprivation, dependence,
and injustice. Let us follow the lead of our humanistic
mentors with a greater passion. Let us increase respect for
the discipline throughout the United States and across the
world. There is much more to be accomplished for
humanity. To feel good about our present effort, to
deserve a positive acknowledgement from history, we are
best off placing our actions in direct line with our ethics.
Endnotes
a) Despite the very public connections between the task
force and the ethics code, APA officials "observing" or
guiding the task force insisted that no new ethical rules
were to be considered during task force discussions. Per-
haps the ethical rules were seen as threatening to positions
held by those officials. Or perhaps there was a fear that
changes in the ethics code would have to be made to sup-
port the report's conclusions, which might have delayed
approval of the PENS Report. Either way, this task was left
up to the APA Ethics Committee alone (Arrigo, J. M., per-
sonal communication, November 20, 2007).
b) Development of this same disorientation-dependence
combination was, not long after Mr. al-Qahtani's interro-
gation, standard operating procedure in Guantanamo, as
the explicit reason for the four weeks of isolation pre-
scribed for all new detainees, designed with the intention
of prepping the detainee for interrogation [20,82]. Fur-
thermore, a few weeks after the standard operating proce-
dures went into effect, medical and psychological
monitoring was required during isolation by order of
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld [83].
c) If Dr. Leso, the psychologist, was unable to detect the
profound harm occurring to Mr. al-Qahtani, FBI agents at
Guantanamo had no such difficulty. Over a month before
this harsh interrogation ended, agents described Mr. al-
Qahtani's condition: "In September or October of 2002
FBI agents observed that a canine was used in an aggres-
sive manner to intimidate detainee __ after he had been
3405,1,"467&8-40/17&#'9&:()#'0-0%1&0'&;%90/0'%%*++,-%!./ 0112.3344452$067$859'739':1$:13/3&3/
!"#$%&/%'(%&)
!"#$%&'()*%+&',-&.,+&/0-#-0,'&"(+",1%12
subjected to intense isolation for over three months. Dur-
ing that time period, __ was totally isolated (with the
exception of occasional interrogations) in a cell that was
always flooded with light. By late November, the detainee
was evidencing behavior consistent with extreme psycho-
logical trauma (talking to non-existent people, reporting
hearing voices, crouching in the corner of a cell covered
with a sheet for hours on end)" [84].
d) We are not here supporting the role of psychologists in
behavioral drift prevention. We are rather clarifying the
minimal conditions under which such a role can ethically
be discussed. There are many other issues that argue
against such a role for psychologists, including lack of
competence, potential conflicts between their responsibil-
ities to interrogators, to the military, and to the broader
society, as well as the argument against abetting the illegal
practices in U.S. detention centers that applies to all pro-
fessionals in these facilities.
e) As of this writing, there has been no word on any action
being taken in the case.
f) On numerous occasions, it has been announced by the
APA that the PENS Report had to be based on extant Ethics
Code provisions; otherwise it would have required a
grueling year-long process to be adopted. Therefore,
despite statements to the contrary, we fail to understand
how such a similar process could be waived for the 2007
resolution. We hope, though, that our concern is unwar-
ranted.
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